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Abstract
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not
only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who
are dissatised with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new
equilibrium. This imposes new renements on equilibrium play, where play depends on
the relative populations of players in dierent roles, among other things.
We also examine nite repetitions of games where players may choose to rematch
in any period. Some equilibria of xed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as
equilibria in a repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social)
equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium
of the corresponding xed-player repeated games. We explore existence under dierent
equilibrium denitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It
is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be completely distinct from renegotiation-
proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto ineÆcient.
JEL classication numbers: A14, C71, C72, C78, J41.
Key words: Social Games, Matching, Games, Repeated Games, Renegotiation
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1. Introduction 
 
 In many social and economic interactions, players have choices not only 
of what actions to play, but also with whom they interact.  For instance, if an 
employee does not like the behavior of his or her employer, he or she can quit and 
work for another firm.  Similarly, in some contexts dissatisfied employers can fire 
their employees and hire new ones.  We see similar examples of rematching in a 
variety of settings ranging from divorce, excommunication, ostracism, to the 
breakup of partnerships or alliances, and the formation of new ones.  This ability 
to rematch has strong implications for behavior within the relationships.  While 
this is a relatively obvious statement, we have no systematic method of modeling 
the play within a game when such play depends on players’ ability to rematch.  In 
this paper we introduce such a methodology and show that it has strong, 
systematic, and intuitive implications for behavior.  We examine a new class of 
games called social games where players not only choose strategies but also 
choose with whom they play.   
 
We examine two situations: one where the choice of matching is made just once, 
and another where the interaction occurs over a finite number of periods and 
players may rematch in any period.   In the one-shot version, a ``matching 
equilibrium’’ consists of a matching of players into various groups who will each 
                                                          
* Financial support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully acknowledged, as is support from 
the Lee Center for Advanced Networking.  We thank Federico Echenique, Jan Eeckhout, Hubert 
Stahn, Myrna Wooders, and the participants at the New Trends in Cooperative Game Theory and 
the Coalition Theory Network Workshops for helpful comments.  Matthew O. Jackson - 
Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA 
(jacksonm@hss.caltech.edu), http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jacksonm/Jackson.html.  Alison Watts - 
Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, 62901, USA, 
(wattsa@siu.edu) 
 
2 
play the game together, as well as a description of what each player will play.  
This equilibrium must satisfy two requirements:  first, the play of each group must 
be a Nash equilibrium; and second, no set of players could all improve their 
payoffs by leaving their current groups, forming a new group, and playing some 
other Nash equilibrium.  In the finitely repeated version of the game, a ``matching 
equilibrium’’ includes both a specification of what each player will play given 
each possible history of matching and play (by all players), as well as a 
specification of who is matched with whom given each possible history.   The 
equilibrium definition is an inductive one.  It requires that no group of players 
could jointly deviate and play a different matching equilibrium in the continuation 
and all improve their payoffs.  We provide two different definitions of repeated 
matching equilibrium depending on how we treat the possibilities for rematching 
with other players.   
 
Our results explore the existence of matching equilibria, as well as their structure.  
We show that matching equilibria generally exist in bipartite settings - where the 
matchings of players are into pairs who play a two-person game.   However, when 
the matchings of players are into groups of three or more players matching 
equilibria may not exist under the most general formulation, but do exist when 
players care only about the play of the game and not about the identities of the 
players with whom they are matched.  We also show that the requirement that no 
group of players desire to leave their current group and match together has strong 
implications for the play in the game.  It implies that only Nash equilibria which 
are not strictly Pareto dominated by other Nash equilibria can be played, and in 
fact results in a selection from that set, even when the population of players is 
completely evenly matched.  We also show that play can depend on the relative 
populations of players available for different roles in the game, with the selection 
among equilibria favoring players who are less populous. 
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When the game is finitely repeated, and rematching is possible in any period, we 
show that existence depends on whether deviating players are allowed only to 
rematch once and for all, or whether they can suggest more complicated 
rematching plans that include other players outside of their group.  The possibility 
of rematching results in a set of equilibria that is neither a superset nor a subset of 
the set of fixed-matching subgame perfect equilibria.  In particular, through 
rematchings players can be rewarded and punished with payoff combinations that 
cannot be achieved in fixed-matching games.  This changes the structure of play 
that can be sustained. 
 
In terms of what we learn about how the ability to rematch affects play, here is a 
partial list of some of the results: 
 
• the threat of rematching selects equilibria that are Pareto undominated by 
other Nash equilibria,  
• player roles with smaller populations are relatively favored, 
• payoffs across matched groups cannot differ by too much (a form of equal 
treatment),  
• in repeated games, the threat of rematching supports play that is not 
supportable without rematching, and 
• in repeated games with mismatched population sizes, play can differ 
completely from renegotiation-proof equilibria. 
 
Related Literature 
 
One obvious strand of related literature is the matching literature that followed the 
seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962) and is detailed in Roth and Sotomayor 
(1989).   That standard matching world is the special case of our model where the 
game played between players is degenerate and players’ payoffs depend only on 
their partners’ identities.  We show that well-known results on existence and the 
lattice structure of matchings from the bipartite matching world have analogs in 
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our setting when the game is bipartite, but also that there are new aspects to the 
matching structure that emerge due to subsequent interaction among players.     
 
Another related strand of literature concerns renegotiation-proof equilibria in 
finitely repeated games (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston (1987), Bernheim and Ray 
(1989), Farrell and Maskin (1989), and Benoit and Krishna (1993)).  This 
corresponds to the other extreme of our model where the matching is degenerate 
but the game is not.  In that special case, our definitions correspond exactly to 
renegotiation-proofness.  In contrast, when there are multiple possible matchings, 
then the relationship between our equilibria and renegotiation-proof equilibria is 
more complicated. If it is possible to match all players at the same time and all 
players are identical within each role, then our equilibria are a superset of the set 
of renegotiation-proof equilibria.  The new equilibria that emerge are supported 
by the threat of rematching.  More generally, in cases with an imbalance in the 
possible groupings of players, our equilibria can differ completely from the set of 
renegotiation-proof equilibria, and include plays that are not supported by any 
previous equilibrium concept.  
 
Finally, there are other1 papers that have examined endogenous interactions and 
implications for behavior.  These include market and bargaining settings as 
studied by Kelso and Crawford (1982), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Hatfield 
and Milgrom (2003), among others; implementation as studied by Jackson and 
Palfrey (1999), and  network formation in coordination games (e.g. Jackson and 
Watts (2002), Droste, Gilles, and Johnson (2003), Corbae and Duffy (2003), and 
Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2004)).    There are also papers showing that 
endogenous interactions can lead to efficient play.  Mailath, Samuelson, and 
Shaked (2001) examine a local interactions model where agents have the ability to 
seclude themselves from undesirable opponents in games that have one Nash 
equilibrium that strictly Pareto dominates all other correlated equilibria.  Rob and 
                                                          
1 See also Watson (1999) who studies mutual investment with uncertainty over types. 
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Yang (2003) and Ghosh and Ray (1996) examine endogenous formation of long 
term relationships where partners play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with each 
other and where players are of different types.   Together, these papers make it 
clear that endogenizing interaction can affect play, albeit in specific settings.  Our 
contribution is to develop a general framework for analyzing matching in game 
theoretic settings and providing results that give us some systematic 
understanding of how the ability to choose with whom one interacts affects the 
play of a game. 
 
 
2. The One-Period Model 
 
 
We begin by providing definitions for settings where the choice to match is taken 
once. 
 
Given is a normal form game with player roles denoted by i∈N={1,...,n}. 
 
There is a  population, Pi, of players who are of role i.  For instance, P1 could be 
all of the women and P2 could be all of the men in the society if the game is the 
``Battle of the Sexes’’ game.   Let   
P  = {p⊂∩Pi such that for each i there exists one a∈Pi such that a∈p} 
be collection of all sets of players consisting of one player in each role.  We use 
i,j, and k to denote indices of different player roles.  We use a,b, and c to denote 
generic players.  We denote generic elements of P by p. 
 
Let ni be the cardinality of Pi, and order player roles so that ni ≥ nk , whenever 
i>k. 
 
Each player role i has a strategy set Si, and a player c∈Pi in that role receives a 
payoff  uc(s,p) if s is the vector of strategies that is played and c is matched in 
group p, where s is in S =   S1× ... ×Sn.   The payoff function ua is a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.    Mixed strategies for a player c in role i 
are denoted µc in ∆(Si).  We let uc(µ,p) denote the expected utility for a player c 
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who is matched in the set of players p and µ denotes the n-vector of mixed 
strategies played by the players in p. 
 
Note that payoffs can depend on both the strategies and the set of players with 
whom a given player is matched.   This allows players to differ, for instance, in 
skill or ability among other things. 
 
A specification of (n; P1,...,Pn; S, u) is called a social game.  
 
Unless otherwise stated we will assume that S is finite, and hence the existence of 
a Nash equilibrium for any group of players is assured.  It will be clear that our 
definitions and results extend directly to any game such that each group of 
matched players has a nonempty and compact set of equilibria, and continuous 
payoffs across (mixed) strategies.  We also note that although we provide the 
definitions for the case of a game in normal form, there are obvious analogs for 
the case where the game played is in extensive form or is a Bayesian game. 
 
A matching is a  mapping f from ∪Pi into (∪Pi)∪P, such that 
(i) either f (a)= {a} or f(a)=p∈P such that a∈p, and 
(ii) if f(a)=p∈P and b∈p, then f(b)=p. 
 
The interpretation is that f(a) is the set of players that a is matched with.  (i) states 
that either player a is unmatched, or else is a matched in a group p.  (ii) states that 
if player a is matched in a group that includes player b, then player b has to be 
matched in that same group.   
 
We normalize the payoff of an unmatched player to 0.  Given a mixed strategy m  
profile for all players and a matching function f, let Uc(m,f) be the expected 
utility that player c receives if the matching f is in place and m is played.   So, 
Uc(m,f)=uc(mp,p), if f(c)=p 
and Uc(m,f)=0 if f(c)={c}, where mp denotes the mixed strategy profile of the 
players in p under m. 
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A matching equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile m, and a matching function f 
such that 
 
(a) if f(c)=p∈P for some player c, then mp is a Nash equilibrium for the players in 
p and Uc(m,f)≥0; and 
 
(b) there does not exist p∈ P, and a profile of strategies µ for the players in p such 
that uc(µ,p)>Uc(m,f) for all c∈ p and such that µ is a Nash equilibrium for the 
players in p.2 
 
A matching equilibrium draws from both non-cooperative and cooperative game 
theory, marrying prominent solution concepts from each.3  It requires Nash 
equilibrium play within matchings, and a form of core stability across matchings.   
The Nash play imposes stability of play within a matching, while the core 
approach imposes restrictions on play both across and within groups.  The 
restrictions within groups derives from the threat of rematching across groups.  To 
preview some of the basic ideas, we begin with a simple example that illustrates 
the selection of equilibrium imposed by the threat of rematching. 
 
Example 1: Battle of the Sexes with Uneven Populations   
 
There is one woman P1= {1} and two men P2={2,3}.  The woman is in the row 
player role, while the men are in the column role and are both identical.  The 
payoffs to the players are described by the following matrix, and the woman’s 
payoff is independent of which man she plays with.  
 
  A B  
                                                          
2 We require a strong form of blocking which, similarly to many other core-based concepts, aids in 
existence. 
3 As an alternative, one could attempt to model things entirely non-cooperatively (or 
cooperatively).  For example, one could model some extensive form process by which groups 
form or reform.  There are strong advantages to the approach we employ here.  Nash equilibrium 
is very well-suited to analyzing play within groups, while the core enables one to model group 
formation in a protocol-free manner and is especially suited to capturing coalitional incentives. 
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 A 1,3 0,0  
 B 0,0 3,1  
 
There are three Nash equilibria to the game: the pure strategy equilibria (A,A) and 
(B,B), and a mixed strategy equilibrium where the man plays A with probability 
3/4 and the woman plays A with probability 1/4.    
 
There are two matching equilibria: one with a matching of f(1)=f(2)={1,2}, and 
another with a matching f’(1)=f’(3)={1,3}.  In both equilibria the matched couple 
plays (B,B).  
 
The other two Nash equilibrium strategies are not part of any matching 
equilibrium, as for instance, under f where 1 and 2 are matched, if the intended 
play is not (B,B) then players 1 and 3 can deviate to match and play (B,B) and 
both be better off.    
 
Note that this example also illustrates that in order to guarantee existence of 
equilibrium it is necessary that a deviation can only block a proposed matching 
equilibrium if the deviating players are all strictly better off.  With a weaker 
notion of blocking, where only some of the deviating players need to strictly 
benefit, equilibrium would fail to exist in the above game. 
 
3. Heterogeneous Players within Populations 
 
We begin with an analysis of the general case, where players within the same role 
can be heterogeneous.  This means that players within a given role might have 
different utility functions, and also that players might care about the identity of 
the other players with whom they are matched.  For instance, in a battle of the 
sexes game different men might  differ both in their preferences over plays of the 
game and with whom they are matched. 
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Moreover, any given man might have preferences over the play of the game that 
depend on which woman he is matched with.   Thus, each group of players can 
have different sets of Nash equilibria and Nash equilibrium payoffs.4      
 
It is easy to see that without any restrictions on payoffs and with more than two 
player roles, existence will generally not be guaranteed.  This follows directly 
from what is known in the multipartite matching literature (e.g., see Roth and 
Sotomayor (1989)), and is illustrated in the following example.  
 
Example 2:  Nonexistence of equilibria in a multi-partite, heterogeneous 
player setting. 
 
Consider 6 players in 3 player roles.  Players 1 and 4 are in role 1, players 2 and 5 
are in player role 2, and players 3 and 6 are in role 3.  Let there be a single Nash 
equilibrium for each matched group of players.  Let the payoffs from those Nash 
equilibria be as follows:  (3,3,3) for groups {1,2,3} and {4,5,6};  (4,4,4) for group 
{4,2,3}; (1,1,1) for groups {1,5,6} and {4,5,3}; (2,5,2) for {1,2,6}; and (0,0,0) for 
all other groups. 
The only potential matchings are then {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}};  {{4,2,3},{1,5,6}}; and 
{{4,5,3},{1,2,6}}, and combinations where some players are unmatched.5 
Note that {4,2,3} blocks the first matching, {1,2,6} blocks the second matching, 
and {4,5,6} blocks the third matching, and that any matching where some players 
are single is blocked as well.  Thus, there is no matching equilibrium. 
 
While existence is a problem in general multipartite settings, it is not a problem in 
bipartite settings nor in settings where players care only about the play in the 
game and not about the identity of the agents with whom they are matched.  Let 
us examine these two settings in turn.   
                                                          
4 This is clearly a generalization of the usual matching world.  If each group had a single Nash 
equilibrium in their game, then we would be in the standard matching world.  If, however, they 
have multiple Nash equilibria, then the problem becomes more intricate, as now the preferences 
are not uniquely defined. 
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3.1  Bipartite Settings 
 
Let NE(p) denote the set of Nash equilibria for the group of players p. 
 
Say that a strategy matching profile (m,f) is plausible if (a) in the definition of 
matching equilibrium is satisfied (mp is an individually rational Nash equilibrium 
for any matched set of players p), and for any c and p=f(c)∈P,  mp is not Pareto 
dominated by any m’ in NE(p).  
 
Say that players are never indifferent if for any two plausible strategy-matching 
pairs (m,f) and (m’,f’),  Uc(m,f)≠Uc(m’,f’) whenever f(c)≠ f’(c) or f(c)=p= f’(c) 
and mp ≠m’p. 
 
In situations where players are never indifferent, let ≥i be the partial order defined 
by saying that (m,f) ≥i  (m’,f’) if all players in role i weakly prefer  (m,f) to 
(m’,f’).   
 
Let us say that a matching equilibrium f is Player role i-optimal if (m,f) ≥i  (m’,f’) 
for all matching equilibria f’. 
 
In the bipartite setting, there is a nice structure to the set of matching equilibria.  
This is well-known for the standard marriage-market setting, and turns out to 
extend to the social-game setting.  The following theorem is an extension of well-
known results in the standard matching literature of Gale and Shapley (1962) and 
Conway (as reported by Knuth (1976)).    
 
Theorem 1:  If there are two player roles, then there exists a matching 
equilibrium.  Moreover, if players are never indifferent, then there exists both a 
Player role 1-optimal matching equilibrium and a Player role 2-optimal matching 
equilibrium.  Additionally,  
                                                                                                                                                              
5 We can represent a matching directly by the induced partition over players. 
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(A) for any two distinct matching equilibria (m,f) and (m’,f’):  (m,f) ≥1  (m’,f’) if 
and only if (m’,f’) ≥2  (m,f), and  
(B) the set of matching equilibria forms a distributive lattice (based on either ≥1 or 
≥2). 
 
 
The first part of Theorem 1 is proven through an extension of the Gale-Shapley 
deferred-acceptance algorithm.  The intuition for the proof is as follows.  Let us 
refer to player role 1 as men and player role 2 as women.  Each man proposes to 
form a match with a woman, and also specifies a Nash equilibrium to be played 
by the couple.  The men start by proposing their most preferred match-
equilibrium (breaking ties in some fixed manner, and making no proposal if they 
prefer to remain single).  Each woman views her proposals and selects the most 
preferred one, provided she would rather not remain single.  Next, each rejected 
man makes a new proposal, and each woman considers any new proposals 
received and selects the best one provided it is preferred to her current situation.  
The algorithm continues until each man is either matched or has made all the 
proposals that he prefers to remaining single.  Note also that as in the traditional 
matching world of Roth and Sotomayor (1989) this algorithm makes it a dominant 
strategy for each man to reveal his true preferences.   
 
 
Proposition 1:  Consider a social game with two player roles such that players 
are never indifferent and all pairs of players (from different populations) have at 
least one Nash equilibrium which generates positive payoffs for both players.  
Every matching equilibrium has the same set of unmatched players. 
 
 
Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 are both generalizations of results from the bipartite 
matching setting.  Next we explore aspects of the model that involve factors not 
present in the standard matching setting. 
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We say one player b weakly dominates another player c (in the same player role) 
if for every potential matched group of players p with c in p, and every Nash 
equilibrium µ for p that gives all players a nonnegative payoff,  there exists a 
Nash equilibrium µ’ for p' where b replaces c that strictly Pareto dominates µ  for 
the players other than b in p' and gives b a nonnegative payoff.   
 
Players are well-ordered if for every pair of players b and c in the same player 
role, either b weakly dominates c, or c weakly dominates b. 
 
When players are well-ordered, we have an unambiguous ordering over the 
players from all players’ perspectives.    It would seem natural to expect that in 
this case, any matching equilibrium would turn out to be assortive (with highest 
ranked players matched with other highest ranked players, etc.), or at least that 
there should exist one such equilibrium.    This is true in the standard marriage-
market setting, but turns out not to be true in the social game setting.  The 
following example shows a case where the only matching equilibrium involves 
mismatching high ranked players with low ranked players.   
 
Example 3:  Non-Assortive Matching.   
 
Let there be two player roles and two players in each role.  Players 1 and 3 are 
those in role 1 and players 2 and 4 are those in player role 2.   When players 1 and 
2 are matched, they have two possible Nash equilibria, leading to payoffs of (4,2) 
and (2,4).6 When players 1 and 4 are matched (and the same for 3 and 2 matched), 
they have two possible Nash equilibrium payoffs of (3,1) and (1,3).  When players 
3 and 4 are matched they can only generate a payoff of (0,0). 
 
                                                          
6 Note that generically, there will be an odd number of Nash equilibria.  The example is easily 
modified to include a third possible Nash equilibrium payoff for each set of players.  For instance, 
have these be payoffs to Battle of the Sexes games, with a mixed strategy equilibrium that leads to 
lower payoffs for both player roles than either of the pure strategy equilibria.   
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Note that here, players 1 and 2 unambiguously dominate their counterparts in the 
same roles, 3 and 4, by generating higher payoffs regardless of their matching.   
Nevertheless, the only matching equilibrium has player 1 matched with player 4 
and player 2 matched with player 3.  To see this, first note that if we try to match 
players 1 and 2, then their payoff must be either (2,4) or (4,2).  Given the 
symmetry, let us assume, without loss of generality, that it is (2,4).  Then players 
1 and 4 can block and get (3,1), which is better for both players.    Indeed, the 
only matching equilibrium has players 1 and 4 matched with payoff (3,1), and 
players 2 and 3 matched with payoffs (1,3)  (with the higher payoff for player 2 
who is in role 2).   
 
This example shows that in order to get a clearly assortative matching a stronger 
definition of “domination” would be required.  It is not enough to have each 
corresponding equilibrium have a higher payoff.  It would be sufficient to have 
the worst equilibrium of a matching with one player dominate the best 
equilibrium of a matching with another.   
 
We know from Theorem 1 that in the two-role case, there exists both a Player 1-
role optimal and a Player 2-role optimal matching equilibrium.  However, as the 
next example shows having an uneven number of players does not guarantee that 
the players in the minority receive their optimal matching equilibrium.   
 
Example 4:  Not all Matching Equilibria are Man-Optimal when Men are the 
Minority. 
 
Let there be two men and three women, with preferences that allow indifference.  
Assume each man-woman pair has two Nash equilibria that are not strictly Pareto 
dominated by another Nash in their game.  Let the Nash payoffs be as follows:  If 
M1W1 are matched then the game played results in Nash equilibria with payoffs 
of (4,1) or (2,3).  If M2W2 are matched then the game played results in Nash 
equilibria with payoffs of (4,1) or (2,3).  If M1W2 or M2W1 are matched then the 
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Nash payoffs are (3,2) or (1,4).  If M1W3 or M2W3 are matched then the Nash 
payoffs are (3,2) and (1,4).    Thus M1 prefers W1 to W2 or W3 in the sense that 
the man’s best equilibrium gives M1 a higher payoff if he is matched to W1 and 
the woman’s best equilibrium gives M1 a higher payoff if he is matched to W1.  
Similarly M2 prefers W2.  Here there are four matching equilibria: M1W1 and 
M2W2 matched and both play the (4,1) Nash and W3 unmatched; M1W2 and 
M2W1 matched and both play the (3,2) Nash and W3 unmatched.  (There are two 
other matching equilibria like the last one with W1 or W2 being unmatched, 
respectively.)  So having more women than men guarantees that each man plays a 
man’s favorite Nash, but it does not guarantee that each man receives his first 
choice of mate, even though this is feasible for both men.   
 
4.  Play-Only Preferences  
 
While matching equilibria may not exist in general multipartite settings, they do 
exist in multipartite settings where players care only about the play of the game 
and not about with whom they are matched.  We now examine this case in detail.   
 
We say that players have play-only preferences if:   
•   b∈Pi  and c∈Pi  implies  ub = uc, and  
• ub(s,p) is independent of p.  
  
Thus, players in the same role have the same preferences, and also players do not 
care about the players they are matched with - only how those players behave.    
Note that this does not require that players from different populations be similar, 
only that players who might play the same role be similar.  Under play only 
preferences, we sometimes write ui for the utility function of players in role i. 
 
4.1  Existence of Equilibrium 
 
We now show that the set of matching equilibria is nonempty and compact. 
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Compactness is important in establishing the existence of repeated matching 
equilibria, which we explore below. 
 
Theorem 2:   The set of matching equilibria of a social game with play-only 
preferences is nonempty and compact.   
 
While the set of matching equilibria is compact, we note that the matching 
equilibrium correspondence (as payoffs are varied) is not upper hemi-continuous.  
This is in contrast with Nash equilibrium, and so the matching leads to changes in 
equilibrium structure, just as many equilibrium refinements do. The failure of 
upper hemi-continuity is illustrated in the following example.   
 
Example 5: Failure of upper hemi-continuity 
   
There are two players and two player roles. Player 1 (the row player) has only one 
strategy, while player 2 (the column player) has two strategies: {left, right}.  The 
payoffs are as follows.   
 
left right 
1 , 1 -1, 1+1/k 
   
For any k, there is a unique matching equilibrium which is to have both players 
remain single, as the only Nash equilibrium is ``right’’ which gives player 1 a 
negative payoff.  In the limit, ``left’’ is a Nash equilibrium, and there is a 
matching equilibrium where both players are matched and get payoffs of 1.  This 
means that both players remaining single is no longer a matching equilibrium in 
the limit, as then (b) is violated.   
 
4.2  Characterization of Equilibrium 
 
We now offer a complete characterization of the set of matching equilibria in 
social games with play-only preferences.   
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Before stating the characterization theorem, let us first explore some of the 
intuitive properties that we should see.  The following simple example shows that 
in a matching equilibrium the play across groups is restricted, including in 
situations where the populations of different player roles are exactly balanced.    
 
Example 6:  Bargaining, the Nash Demand Game, Double Auctions, and 
Ultimatum Games.   
 
There are two populations called ``Buyers’’ and `Sellers’’.    A matched buyer 
and seller each announce a price in [0,1].   If the price of the buyer exceeds the 
price of the seller, then there is trade of a single unit of a good that has value 1 to 
the buyer and value 0 to the seller, and at the average of the two prices.7   So 
S1=S2=[0,1] and the payoff to the buyer (say role 1) is 1-(s1+s2)/2 if s1≥s2, and 0 
otherwise; and the payoff to the seller (role 2) is (s1+s2)/2 if s1≥s2, and 0 
otherwise.  There are a continuum of Pareto efficient pure strategy Nash equilibria 
to this game (where both players say the same price), as well as a Pareto 
dominated equilibrium where the seller says 1 and the buyer 0. 
 
If there are fewer buyers than sellers, so P1<P2, then all matching equilibria have 
all buyers matched and each match playing the equilibrium where s1=s2=0.  If 
there are more buyers than sellers, so P1>P2, then all matching equilibria have all 
sellers matched and each match playing the equilibrium where s1=s2=1.   In 
situations where the populations are evenly matched so that P1=P2, then there are 
infinitely many matching equilibria.  However, there are strong restrictions across 
equilibria.   All players are matched and every match announces s1=s2=p, where p 
is the same across matches.    To see this, note that, for instance, if two matched 
groups traded at prices p’ and p where p’>p, then the buyer from the first group 
                                                          
7 It should be clear that any variation on this game will have similar features.  For instance, 
allowing the price to be any function of the announced prices, or only having trade if the 
announced prices coincide, or having the buyer pay the buyer’s price and the seller receive the 
seller’s price (and burning the remainder). etc. 
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and the seller from the second group would both be strictly better off by 
rematching and trading at any price strictly between p’ and p. 
 
This example shows not only how relative population sizes interact with 
equilibrium selection.  It also shows how an ``equal-treatment’’ property (that is 
commonly implied by core solutions in settings with replications) manifests itself 
here.  With evenly matched populations equilibrium payoffs cannot differ by too 
much.  
 
The general implications of core stability on the selection of equilibrium within 
matchings is made precise in Theorem 3, which we now present. 
 
Let PO(k) represent the set of k-vectors of utility (u1′, u2′,…, uk′) such that  
• player roles {1,…,k} receive a nonnegative payoff, and  
• if µ is a Nash equilibrium such that all player roles get a positive payoff, then 
there exists i≤k such that ui′≥ui(µ). 
 
Given a matching and mixed strategy profile (m,f) of some social game with play-
only preferences, for each i let  
                              vi(m,f)=min{c∈Pi, f(c)≠{c}}Uc(m,f). 
 
Thus, vi is the minimum utility obtained under (m,f) by any player in role i who is 
matched under f. 
 
Theorem 3:   Consider a social game with play-only preferences.  Suppose that 
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium such that all player roles have a positive 
payoff8 and let k be the smallest i such that ni+1 > ni, letting k=n if there is no 
such i.  Then (f,m) is a matching equilibrium if and only if  
(i) all players in P1 to Pk are matched, 
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(ii) each matched group p plays a Nash equilibrium mp such that all 
players get a                        nonnegative payoff, and 
(iii) (v1(m,f), v2(m,f),…, vk(m,f)) ∈ PO(k).   
 
 
 
The properties illustrated in Examples 1 and 2, in the case of bipartite matchings 
generalize as follows.   
 
Corollary 1 (Favoring of Less Populous Roles): Consider a social game 
with play-only preferences where population 1 is the smallest (n1 < nk for all 
k>1), and where at least one of player role 1’s most preferred Nash equilibria 
gives all player roles a positive payoff.    In any matching equilibrium, all players 
of role 1 are matched and all groups of players play one of player role 1’s most 
preferred Nash equilibria. 
 
Corollary 2 (Nearly Equal Treatment): Consider a two-player role 
setting, where no player is indifferent between any two Nash equilibria.  If (m,f) 
is a matching equilibrium, then for any two players a and b in the same role i, 
there does not exist any Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium  µ such that Ua(m,f)< 
ui(µ) < Ub(m,f). 
 
Corollary 2 does not claim that all players in the same role must receive the same 
payoff (which is not true), but that the payoffs cannot be too dispersed, in that 
there cannot lie any Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium payoffs between any two 
players’ payoffs.  In this sense the players in the same role are nearly equally 
treated under a matching equilibrium. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 The ``if’’ part of the statement still holds if there exists a Nash equilibrium where all player roles 
get a nonnegative payoff (as opposed to positive).  Clearly, if in every Nash equilibrium some 
player role gets a negative payoff then all matching equilibria have all players unmatched.   
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5. Finitely Repeated Social Games 
 
We now extend the concept of matching equilibrium to finitely repeated games.  
For this analysis, we specialize to the setting of play-only preferences, which is a 
maintained assumption for the remainder of the paper unless otherwise stated. 
 
Consider a sequence of social games played over the finite set of periods 
{1,2,3,...,T}. 
Players receive the discounted sum of payoffs of per period plays, with a discount 
rate of δ in [0,1].  Rematchings are possible in any period.9 
 
Let h=[s1,f1;s2,f2;...st,ft] denote a generic history of the game through some time t, 
which includes a list of the strategies played and the matches that were in place.  
Let H(t) denote the union of all histories of the game through time t.   Let  H=∩0T-
1  H(t) be the set of all finite histories that could have been observed in some 
period through the beginning of period T.  We adopt the convention that H(0) is a 
singleton (empty) history which we denote by ∅.  
 
A (behavioral) strategy for a player j in role i is a map σj:H → ∆(Si).  The 
behavioral strategy profiles for the T period game are denoted S(T).  So a strategy 
for a player indicates which mixed strategy they play following any finite history 
of length no more than T-1.  
 
A T-period matching function is a mapping F:H → MF, which indicates the 
current period matching following any history h in H.  Let F(h,i) denote i’s match 
after history h.  The set of all T-period matching functions is denoted MF(T), and 
so MF(1)=MF. 
 
                                                          
9 If rematchings are only possible ex ante, then the analysis is similar to that in the previous 
sections (where one can modify definitions to require that play be according to subgame perfect 
equilibrium rather than just Nash equilibrium). 
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Let Uc(σ,F) denote player c’s discounted expected utility if the profile of 
strategies σ are played and the matchings are governed by F. 
 
The set of repeated matching equilibria of a T-period social game, denoted 
RME(T), is defined inductively as follows. 
 
Let RME(1) be the matching equilibria of the 1 period game.  
 
Inductively, let RPE(t) be the set of (σ,F) in S(t) x MF(t) such that  
(i) (σ(h),F(h)) in RME(t-1) for all h in H(1), and  
(ii) no player wants to deviate from σ(∅) given the current matching F(∅) 
and anticipating the continuation governed by (σ,F). 
 
Let RME(t) be the set of  (σ,F) in RPE(t) such that  
(a) there does not exist any c ∈ N with 0>Uc(σ,F), and  
(b) there does not exist any S⊂N and (σ’,F’) in RPE(t) such that  
Uc(σ’,F’)>Uc(σ,F) for all c in S, and such that F’(h,c)∈S for all h and for 
all c in S. 
 
This definition has the same structure as the original definition of matching 
equilibrium, where the idea of Nash equilibrium is replaced by the notion of  
RPE(t) – an equilibrium that is a perfect equilibrium anticipating that the 
continuation will be a matching equilibrium of t-1 periods.    
 
Note that here we allow a potentially large group S to deviate under (b), while in 
the single-period version we just allowed a single group p to deviate under (b).  In 
a one-period setting, these two definitions are obviously equivalent.  It is only 
with two or more periods that the definitions diverge.    This will become clearer 
shortly, as we show that equilibria exist if we only allow a single group p to 
deviate, while they do not always exist (with two or more periods) if we allow 
larger groups to deviate. 
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Before discussing existence issues, let us examine an example where we see how 
the threat of rematching can influence play.    
 
Example 7:  Centipede and Trust Games: Repeated Matching Equilibria that 
are not Nash Equilibria (without matching) 
 
Consider a simple version of a centipede game, which can also be viewed as a 
variation on a trust game.  We illustrate the game both in normal and extensive 
forms. 
 
Extensive form:                                                             Normal form: 
 
 
 
 
             2,2        1,11 
 
There are three players, one in  role 1 and two in role 2, so that P1={1} and 
P2={2,3}. 
There is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium to this game, which is for both 
players to play down.   There are many mixed strategy equilibria, but they all 
have player role 1 playing down, and player role 2 playing down with probability 
at least 8/9, and thus all Nash equilibria lead to the 2,2 outcome.    
 
Let us consider the matching equilibria in a twice repeated version of this game.  
First, let us note that without any possibility of rematching, the unique Nash (and 
hence subgame perfect, renegotiation-proof, etc.) equilibrium outcome is Down, 
Down in both periods.  The following is a repeated matching equilibrium where 
play is Across, Across in the first period: 
 
In period 1 players 1 and 2 are matched and both play across. 
 
10,10
  Player role  2 Player 
role  1 
              Down    Across 
Down     2,2         2,2 
Across   1,11      10,10 
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In period 2, if player 2 deviated in the first period, then players 1 and 3 are 
matched and both play down.  Otherwise players 1 and 2 are matched and both 
play down.   
 
Here, the threat of rematching induces player 2 to play across in the first period 
game, and makes it possible for the players to reach the Pareto efficient payoff of 
10,10, which is not reached as part of any equilibrium (Nash, subgame perfect, 
renegotiation-proof, etc.) in a finitely repeated game without rematching.     
 
While rematching can lead to new equilibria, it can also lead to existence 
problems, even with evenly matched populations.  This is illustrated in the 
following example.   
 
Example 8: Nonexistence of Repeated Matching Equilibrium 
 
There are two periods and a discount factor of 1. 
 
There are three player roles and twelve players {1,...,12}.  Players 1,4,7,10 are in 
role 1, players 2,5,8,11 are in role 2, and players 3,6,9,12 are in role 3. 
 
Player role 1 is the row player, player role 2 is the column player, and player role 
3 choose among the matrices.  Payoffs are as follows. 
 
I 
 left center right 
up 5,1,3 -, -, - -, -, - 
middle -, -, 9 -,26,- 25,25,25 
down -, -, - 6, 8, 10 28,9,- 
 
II 
 left center right 
up 21,-,- -, 13, 16 8, 10, 6 
middle -, -, - 3,5,1 -, -, - 
down 20,20,20 -, -, - 9,-,- 
 
III 
 left center right 
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up -,18,- 15, 15, 15 -, -, - 
middle 10, 6, 8 -,-,- -, -, - 
down 13, -, 23 -, -, 13 1,3,5 
 
 
The entries with a ‘-‘ have a largely negative payoff.  
    
There are three pure strategy equilibria:  (up, left, I); (middle, center, II); and  
(down, right, III).   There are also mixed strategy equilibria, which for negative 
enough payoffs in the ‘-‘ entries results in largely negative payoffs for at least one 
player.   
 
In a one-period setting, any matching equilibrium must have all players matched, 
and each group playing one of the three pure strategy Nash equilibria.  
 
Let us now argue that there does not exist any repeated matching equilibrium of 
the two-period game.     
 
To do this, we first show that if we consider just the set of players {1,...,9}, then 
there is a two-period matching equilibrium. 
 
The first period matching is ({1,2,3},{4,5,6},{7,8,9}).   In the first period, the first 
group plays (middle,right,I), the second group plays (down,left,II), and the third 
group plays (up, center,III).     
 
If there are no deviations in the first period, then the second period matching is 
({1,5,9},{4,8,3},{7,2,6}), with corresponding plays of (up,left,I), 
(middle,center,II), and (down,right,III), respectively.     
 
If there is a deviation by some player k in the first period, then in the second 
period k is matched into some group that plays the Nash equilibrium that gives k a 
payoff of 1 (the particular matching is irrelevant).  If there are deviations by more 
than one player in the first period, then some arbitrary one-period matching 
equilibrium is played in the second period. 
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The overall payoffs to the nine players are (30,28,26,23,21,25,16,20,18), in order. 
Let us check that this is a repeated matching equilibrium.   It is clearly a matching 
equilibrium for any history in the second period.  So let us check the first period.  
First let us check that no player wants to deviate from their prescribed strategy.  
Player 1 could benefit by deviating from middle to down in the first period, for a 
gain of 3.  However, then in the second period instead of receiving a payoff of 5, 
player 1 would get a payoff of 1, so overall the change in payoff would be +3-4=-
1.    Similar calculations for each player verify that no player could benefit from a 
unilateral deviation.   
 
Next, let us check that no group of players could benefit by reorganizing 
themselves.  The key to this is that in each group in the first period there is some 
player who has a ``high’’ potential payoff to a deviation (a gain of 3), another 
player who has a medium gain from a deviation (a gain of 1) and the last player 
who has no gain.  Given that second period payoffs are vectors of the sort  5,3, 
and 1 to respective players and each player gets at least 1, the available deterrents 
to deviations are payoff changes from 5 to 1 (a loss of 4) and from 3 to 1 (a loss of 
2).   Note that the first player in a group who plays (25,25,25) must get a 5 payoff 
in the second period.  The second player must get at least a 3 payoff in the second 
period.  This already requires two different groups in the second period.  It is then 
easy to see that in order to sustain more than one group getting payoffs of 
(25,25,25) in the first period would require at least four groups in the second 
period.  Careful checking along these lines shows that getting (25,25,25); 
(20,20,20), and (15,15,15) is the best that one can achieve in terms of first period 
payoffs.  While there are still some details to check, this is the heart of verifying 
that this a two-period repeated matching equilibrium. 
 
Now let us turn to the situation with four groups.   Any equilibrium where at least 
two groups are not getting payoffs above (15,15,15) in the first period will be 
blocked by some set of three groups deviating to play the three-group equilibrium 
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of the two period game.   So this suggests that we try to have some three groups 
play the three group matching equilibrium, and then one group left to play alone.  
The best the remaining group could get would be (10,6,8) in the first period and 
(5,1,3) in the second period - or some permutation of that (sustained by threats of 
rematching in the second period if a player deviates in the first period).    
However, in that case, the second, third and fourth groups could deviate (as S in 
(b) of the definition) to play the three-group equilibrium and all be made better 
off.  Any permutation of players will still have such a deviation. 
This leaves us only with possibilities of trying to sustain, say, two groups getting 
(25,25,25) in the first period, with two other groups getting lower payoffs.  
However, this would require the latter two groups getting payoffs of (1,1,5) in the 
second period.  That will not allow those two groups to sustain anything but a 
Nash equilibrium play in the first period.  Either of those groups could deviate 
alone to improve by earning a permutation of (10,6,8)+(5,1,3).   Similar reasoning 
rules out any other attempt to sustain at least two groups getting payoffs of at least 
(15,15,15) in the first period.  Thus there is no repeated matching equilibrium to 
this game.  ◊ 
  
We remark that the above example also shows (to the careful reader) that even if 
we adopted a ``coalition-proof’’ style equilibrium definition, where deviations 
have to be immune to deviations by further subgroups, existence would not be 
obtained.   
 
The difficulty of existence of equilibrium is overcome by a weaker definition of 
repeated matching equilibrium, where only individual players or single matched 
groups are allowed to deviate.  While this is not always as strong a concept, it is 
still of interest and often coincides with repeated matching equilibrium.  
 
The set of group-stable repeated matching equilibria of a T-period social 
game, denoted GSRME(T), is defined inductively as follows. 
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Let GSRME(1) be the matching equilibria of the 1 period social game. 
Inductively, let GSRPE(t) be the set of (σ,F) in S(t) x MF(t) such that  
(i) (σ(h),F(h)) in GSRME(t-1) for all h in H(1), and  
(ii) no player wants to deviate from σ(∅) given the current matching F(∅) 
and anticipating the continuation governed by (σ,F). 
 
Let GSRME(t) be the set of  (σ,F) in GSRPE(t) such that  
(a) there does not exist any c ∈ N with 0>Uc(σ,F), and  
(b) there does not exist any p ∈ P and (σ’,F’) in GSRPE(t) such that  
Uc(σ’, F’)>Uc(σ,F) for all c in p, and such that F’(h,c)=p or c for all h and 
for all c in p. 
 
We now show that group-stable repeated matching equilibria always exist. 
 
Theorem 4:  The set of  group-stable repeated matching equilibrium is 
nonempty and compact for every t.  Moreover, there exists such an equilibrium 
where the repeated matching function is constant on the equilibrium path.   
 
Note that it is not the case that simply repeating a one period matching 
equilibrium is a group stable repeated matching equilibrium.   
   
As we have remarked, the concept of (group-stable) repeated matching 
equilibrium incorporates some notions of renegotiation.  That is, it is possible that 
the set of players p who consider changing equilibria in part (b) is actually already 
matched.   It is very important to note, however, that although the definition of 
repeated matching equilibrium imposes some forms of renegotiation, it is neither 
a subset nor a superset of the set of renegotiation equilibria (except when t=1).  
This follows since changing the set of equilibria in a repeated game changes both 
the possibilities at a given date, and also the possible threat points offered for 
other dates.  The changes in these combinations leads the sets to differ in a non-
nested way when there are more than 2 periods.   
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In some cases, there is a relationship between group-stable repeated matching 
equilibria and renegotiation-proof equilibria.  The following proposition 
illustrates this. 
 
Proposition 2:  Let all populations be of equal size and suppose that all 
renegotiation-proof equilibria are such that each player’s expected utility is non-
negative in all subgames.   Then every renegotiation-proof equilibrium is part of a 
group-stable repeated matching equilibrium with a constant matching function f 
where all players are matched and where each group plays the same renegotiation-
proof equilibrium. 
 
The proposition holds for group-stable repeated matching equilibria, but not for 
repeated matching equilibria.  This is clear from Example 8, as repeated matching 
equilibria need not exist even when there exists a renegotiation-proof equilibrium 
and populations are evenly balanced.  It should also be noted that Proposition 2 
requires all groups to play the same equilibrium: just like in the 1-period game, 
having some groups play one renegotiation-proof equilibrium and other groups 
play another renegotiation-proof equilibrium may not be a group-stable matching 
equilibrium.   
 
While we already saw in Example 7, that when populations are not evenly 
matched there may exist (group-stable) repeated matching equilibria that are not 
Nash equilibria, much less renegotiation-proof equilibrium, we can also show that 
if populations are not evenly matched, then both the set of group-stable repeated 
matching equilibria and the set of repeated matching equilibria may no longer 
contain any renegotiation-proof equilibrium.  This is because the minority player 
types will get to choose their favorite Nash equilibrium in the last period.  Thus 
other threats will no longer be credible and the set of equilibria will change.  This 
is illustrated in the following example. 
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Example 9: (Group-Stable) Repeated Matching Equilibria are neither 
renegotiation-proof nor Pareto Optimal 
 
This game is based on one in Benoit and Krishna [1993], extended to allow for 
populations of players.    Let player 1 be in player role 1 (row) and players 2 and 3 
be in player role 2 (column).  The game is repeated twice, δ=.9, and payoffs are 
 
   A B C 
  A 0,0 1,3 0,0 
  B 3,1 0,0 6,0 
   
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria:  A,B and B,A, as well as a 
Pareto dominated mixed strategy equilibrium.  There are three types of 
renegotiation-proof equilibria (as defined by Benoit and Krishna (1993)):   
(1) play B,A in period 1 and A,B in period 2, or vice versa.   
(2) play B,C in period 1 and play A,B in period 2.  If player 2 deviates in 
period 1 then play B,A in period 2.  
(3) play A,B in period 1 and A,B in period 2.  
 
All (group-stable) repeated matching equilibria have player 1 matched in each 
period and have the matched players play B,A in both periods.  To see this notice 
that in period 2,  all matching equilibria must play B,A (by Theorem 3).  This 
eliminates (1), (2) and (3) as possible equilibria.  Player 1 would like to play 
equilibrium (2) and see play of B,C in period 1.  However, his or her partner will 
always have incentive to deviate in period 1 (gaining a payoff of 1, while losing at 
most .9 in the second period, as only B,A could be played in the second period).  
It is now easy to see that B,A must also be played in the first period.  At these 
(group-stable) repeated matching equilibria, the expected payoffs  are (5.7, 1.9) to 
the matched players if the same players are matched in both periods.    This is 
Pareto dominated by (6.9, 2.7) which are the expected payoffs from renegotiation-
proof equilibrium 2.  Thus, in this example none of  the (group-stable) repeated 
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matching equilibria are renegotiation-proof, and any of them that have constant 
matchings are Pareto dominated by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. 
 
 
To see a situation where the set of Repeated matching equilibria differ completely 
from the set of subgame perfect equilibrium plays without rematching, let us 
revisit example 8. 
 
Example 8 revisited:   
 
Consider the centipede/trust game of example 8, but now repeated four times 
instead of just twice.   The following is a repeated matching equilibrium: 
 
In period 1, players 1 and 2 are matched and both play across. 
 
In period 2, players 1 and 3 are matched and both play across if there was no 
deviation in period 1; and otherwise both play down.   
 
In periods 3 and 4, all players play down.   If player 2 deviated in period 1, then 
players 1 and 3 are matched in periods 3 and 4.  If player 2 did not deviate in 
period 1, but player 3 deviated in period 2, then players 1 and 2 are matched in 
periods 3 and 4.  Otherwise, players 1 and 2 are matched in period 3 and players 1 
and 3 are matched in period 4. 
 
The fact that this is a repeated matching equilibrium and that the overall payoffs 
are (24,12,12) means that no equilibrium where players play down in each period 
can be supported as a repeated matching equilibrium.    
 
This example also shows the difference between repeated matching equilibrium 
and group-stable repeated matching equilibrium.  While the above is a group-
stable repeated matching equilibrium, there is a also group-stable repeated 
matching equilibrium where all players play down in all periods, as this cannot be 
improved upon by a group of only two players. 
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6. Discussion 
 
We have defined and analyzed a new class of games called social games where 
players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play.  This 
imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative 
populations of players in different roles, among other things.   In finitely repeated 
settings, where players may choose to rematch in any period, we also find some 
interesting new aspects imposed by the threat of rematching.  On the one hand, 
the threat of rematching can sustain new equilibria, sometimes with higher 
payoffs than without matching.  On the other hand, the threat of rematching can 
limit the equilibria played within a period to those most beneficial to players in 
least populous roles, and this limits the types of threats that are available to 
sustain equilibria in repeated settings.   
 
While we have analyzed both the existence and the structure of the equilibria in 
various settings, there is much more to be learned about such equilibria and their 
characteristics in various settings.   Further studies include future study of the 
setting we have examined, as well as extensions and variations on that setting.  
For instance, one could introduce additional heterogeneity in allowing strategy 
spaces to be player specific, or by allowing for externalities across groups.  We 
now briefly mention several extensions of the analysis that obviously deserve 
future investigation.   
 
 
6.1 Symmetric Games with a Single Population of Players 
 
The first extension is to settings where there is just one population of players who 
can play in any role.  A natural (but certainly not the only) setting in which to 
consider this is where the game is symmetric.  Here, any set of n players may be 
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grouped together and all players are ex ante identical.   The definition of matching 
equilibrium extends in the obvious way.10   
   
The following example shows that once we are in a world with a single 
population of players, existence of a matching equilibrium is no longer 
guaranteed, even in symmetric two-player single-period games.  
 
Example 10.   Nonexistence in a single-population, symmetric, one-period 
social game   
 
There are three players and a game involves two players, and has payoffs 
 
  A B  
 A 0,0 1,2  
 B 2,1 0,0  
 
There does not exist any matching equilibrium.  Any equilibrium would 
necessarily have two players matched and play either (A,B) or (B,A) as the mixed 
strategy equilibrium is strictly Pareto dominated by either pure strategy 
equilibrium.  However, in any such matching the player getting the lower payoff 
can deviate together with the unmatched player and both be made better off (by 
playing the equilibrium that is less favorable to the formerly unmatched player 
and more favorable to the previously matched player).   
 
This example shows that it is important for existence in single population social 
games that there exist a matching that includes all players.   In situations where 
there does exist a matching which includes all players, then there does exist an 
equilibrium, as described in the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 3.  Consider a single population social game with identical 
players.  If there exists a matching that includes all players, then there exists a 
matching equilibrium.  Moreover: 
                                                          
10 Simply let P in the definition be the set of all vectors of n players. 
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• If every Nash equilibrium yields a negative payoff for at least one player, 
then all matching equilibria have all players unmatched. 
• At most n groups have different minimum payoffs, and in fact at most n-1 
players get a payoff that is less than the maximal minimum payoff among 
Nash equilibria.    
 
The proof is straightforward and left to the reader. 
 
Note that the proposition shows that such a matching equilibrium will have 
``most’’ groups playing a symmetric Nash equilibrium if one exists that is not 
Pareto dominated by another Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
In settings where all players come from one population and each can play in any 
role we find that beyond differences in existence, we also see differences in play 
from what we would see if players could not fill any role. 
 
Example 11.  Two-Period Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
Let there be three identical players who play the following Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game which is repeated twice.  Let the discount rate δ=1.   
 
    C D 
   C 3,3 -2,4 
   D 4,-2 2,2 
 
There exists a repeated matching equilibrium where two players are matched and 
where the matched pair plays C,C in period 1 and D,D in period 2.  (Since this 
game has a unique Nash equilibrium, the matched pair must play D,D in period 
2.)  If one of the matched players deviates in period 1 then the other matched 
player will sever this tie and will link with the unmatched player in period 2.  So 
if a player deviates in period 1 he receives an expected payoff of 4 while if he 
does not deviate he receives an expected payoff of 5.  Notice that the unmatched 
player cannot offer either matched player a credible better deal in period 1.  Thus 
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cooperation is sustained in the first period, which differs from any other 
equilibrium concept - including group-stable repeated matching equilibrium 
where players have set roles that they can fill. 
 
 
6.2 Other Deviation Possibilities 
 
We have examined two possibilities in terms of defining matching equilibria in 
finitely repeated settings.   There are still other possibilities.  We mention one 
other definition here, but this definition and others are worthy of further 
investigation.  In our definition of group-stable repeated matching equilibrium, 
the deviating group is just on its own, and cannot rely on rematching with any 
other players in any future continuation of the game.   One could allow for a 
group to deviate in one period, but then still have rematchings with other groups 
possible in subsequent periods.  We provide such a definition and an example of 
non-existence in the appendix.   
 
 
6.3  Infinite Horizons 
 
It is of interest to have definitions for repeated matching equilibria that cover the 
case of infinite horizon games.   As with renegotiation-proof equilibria, once one 
goes to an infinite horizon, it is no longer clear what a ``natural’’ equilibrium 
definition is; especially as an inductive definition can no longer be used.  This is 
an important problem that we leave for future research.   
 
6.4 Other Equilibrium Definitions 
 
Our definition of matching equilibrium has examined Nash equilibrium within a 
single period version of the game.  We can also think of situations where the stage 
game is an extensive form game and we apply subgame perfection.  As subgame 
perfect equilibrium and Nash equilibrium differ, it is clear that we will end up 
with different conclusions in some games.    
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For instance, reconsider the bargaining game of Example 5 in a case where buyers 
are less numerous than sellers (P1>P2), but where sellers move first in 
announcing their price.  This is then essentially the same as an ultimatum game, 
and while there are Nash equilibria that lead trade at any price in [0,1], the only 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is trade at a price of 1.   This means that if 
we apply matching equilibrium where we apply subgame perfection as part of the 
equilibrium concept, the only outcome is that all matched groups trade at a price 
of 1, even though buyers are less numerous than sellers. This derives from the fact 
that no group of matched players can commit to play anything other than a 
subgame perfect equilibrium in the one shot extensive form.  In order to escape 
such a conclusion, one would need to either allow some commitment on the part 
of players at the time where they are deciding on matchings, or else to allow for 
rematchings within the extensive form.  Our analysis of repeated games considers 
such rematchings when the extensive form is a repeated game, but one could also 
examine matching equilibria where rematchings are possible at a variety of times 
in more general extensive form games. 
 
 
6.5 Cooperative Games 
 
We have considered settings where the period game is a non-cooperative game.  
One can also provide analogous matching definitions where the period game is a 
cooperative game, either TU or NTU.   Many of our results extend directly, 
especially in the static case, where one would simply replace Nash equilibrium 
play with a solution for the cooperative game.  In the repeated context, the 
prospect of rematching alters the set of equilibria in some periods.   This means 
that an analysis of a repeated cooperative game would in fact be easier than the 
analysis of a repeated non-cooperative game.  For instance, provided there is 
existence whatever is seen as the solution concept for the cooperative game in the 
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static setting, then there will be existence of repeated matching equilibria (and not 
just group-stable ones) in the repeated setting.   
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Appendix. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1:   Let us refer to player role 1 as men and player role 2 as 
women.  To find a matching equilibrium we extend the Gale-Shapley deferred-
acceptance algorithm, where a man proposes to a woman and also proposes a 
Nash equilibrium to be played by the couple.  Let each man rank all the Nash 
equilibria from playing the game with every possible woman, where the man 
discards any Nash/woman pair which gives him a negative payoff.  Artificially 
break ties, so that we have a strict ranking over acceptable mates and equilibria 
for each man, and similarly for each woman.  The algorithm is as follows.  First, 
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each man simultaneously proposes to his best Nash/woman pair (i.e., he proposes 
to this woman and proposes that they play this particular Nash equilibrium).  Each 
woman then reviews her options and accepts the proposal of the man/Nash pair 
she likes best. If there is no proposal which gives her a nonnegative payoff, then 
all proposals are rejected.  In the second round each currently unmatched man 
proposes to his second best Nash/woman pair.  Again the women each accept 
their best acceptable proposal, where now a proposal from the first round is 
rejected if a woman receives a better proposal in the second round.  This process 
continues iteratively, where each time a man is unmatched he proposes the best 
acceptable woman/Nash pair that he has not yet proposed, or else makes no 
proposal.  The process ends when all unmatched men have exhausted their 
acceptable proposals.   This process must end at a matching equilibrium:  By 
construction, (a) of matching equilibrium is satisfied. The argument that (b) must 
also be satisfied is as follows.  If there is a man who would prefer to be matched 
with someone else than his current mate and/or would prefer to play a different 
Nash equilibrium, then it must be that he already proposed this Nash to this 
woman and that at some prior step she turned him down, which means she had a 
better (or equivalent) offer.  As the woman’s ending match must be at least as 
good as the one she had at that time (by the structure of the algorithm), this 
woman would not be made better off by leaving her current Nash/man for this 
Nash/man pair.   Thus, (b) is satisfied.  If players are never indifferent, then this 
algorithm must end at the man-optimal matching equilibrium, since the algorithm 
ends with a matching equilibrium where each man is matched to his most 
preferred achievable Nash/woman.  A woman-optimal matching equilibrium can 
be similarly constructed.   
 
Let us now prove the remainder of the theorem.  First we prove part (A) and show 
that if (m,f) ≥1  (m’,f’) then (m’,f’) ≥2  (m,f).  Suppose to the contrary that (m,f) ≥1  
(m’,f’) and that at least one woman, say W2, strictly prefers (m,f) to (m’,f’).  If 
W2’s spouse at (m,f), say M1, also strictly prefers (m,f) to (m’,f’) then (m’,f’) is 
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not a matching equilibrium since W2 and M1 prefer to sever their (m’,f’) ties and 
link with each other and play their (m,f) Nash.  Thus it must be that M1 is 
indifferent between (m,f) and (m’,f’).  Since we assumed players are never 
indifferent this is only possible if M1 has the same spouse/Nash at both equilibria.  
But if this is true, then W2 would have the same spouse/Nash at both equilibria 
and thus would not strictly prefer (m,f).  Thus the “if” statement of part (A) must 
be true. The “only if” statement follows from the above; simply replace the role 1 
(2) players with the role 2 (1) players.  
 
Next we prove part (B).  Let (m,f) and (m’,f’) be two matching equilibria.  Define 
sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} to be the strategy matching profile where each man is matched 
with the spouse/Nash pair he most prefers (or points to) from either his (m,f) or 
(m’,f’) spouse/Nash pair.  Define inf1{(m,f), (m’,f’)} to be the strategy matching 
profile where each man is matched with the spouse/Nash he least prefers from 
either his (m,f) or (m’,f’) spouse/Nash pair.  We show that sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} and 
inf1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} are both plausible matching profiles and that they are both in 
fact matching equilibria.  First we show that sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} is plausible.  It is 
enough to show that there do not exist two men, say M1 and M3, who both point 
to the same spouse, say W2, when they point to their preferred spouse/Nash pairs.  
Suppose to the contrary that two such men exist and that M1 is matched to W2 at 
matching equilibrium (m,f) while M3 is matched to W2 at matching equilibrium 
(m’,f’).  Since players are never indifferent, W2 must prefer either her 
spouse/Nash at (m,f) or at (m’,f’).  Say she prefers M1 or her spouse/Nash at 
(m,f).  But then (m’,f’) cannot be a matching equilibrium since W2 prefers her 
spouse/Nash at (m,f) and M1 also prefers his spouse/Nash at (m,f); thus M1 and 
W2 prefer to sever their (m’,f’) links and link to each other and play their (m,f) 
Nash.  Thus sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)}must be plausible.    
 
Next we show that sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} is also a matching equilibrium.  Suppose to 
the contrary that sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} is not a matching equilibrium, thus there 
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exists a woman, say W2, who would like to sever her sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)}tie and 
link with a different spouse/Nash, say M1.  At sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} W2 must be 
linked with the same spouse/Nash she is linked with at either (m,f) or (m’,f’), say 
it is (m,f).  Since (m,f) is a matching equilibrium it must be that if W2 asks M1 to 
sever his (m,f) tie and link with her and play a certain Nash, M1 says no.  Since 
M1 weakly prefers his spouse/Nash at sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} to (m,f) he will also 
refuse to sever his sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} link to link with W2.  Thus even though 
W2 would like to sever her sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)}tie and link with another 
spouse/Nash she is unable to do so.  Thus sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} must be a matching 
equilibrium. 
 
Next we show that inf1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} is plausible and is a matching equilibrium.  
By part (a) we know that inf1{(m,f),(m’,f’)} is the same as sup2{(m,f),(m’,f’)}.  
Thus from the above analysis sup2{(m,f),(m’,f’)} must also be a matching 
equilibrium. 
 
Lastly we show that if there exists (m’’,f’’) such that (m’’,f’’)≥1(m,f) and 
(m’’,f’’)≥1(m’,f’) then (m’’,f’’)≥1 sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)}.  This follows from the 
definition of sup1{(m,f),(m’,f’)}.  Similarly if there exists (m’’,f’’) such that 
(m’’,f’’)≤1(m,f) and (m’’,f’’)≤1(m’,f’) then (m’’,f’’)≤1 inf1{(m,f),(m’,f’)}.  Thus 
the set of matching equilibria must form a lattice (based on either ≥1 or ≥2). 
  
To show that the lattice (based on either  ≥1 or ≥2) is distributive involves  
straightforward manipulations, which we leave to the reader to verify. ◊ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  If the player roles are of the same size, then all players 
are matched.  So consider the case where there are fewer players in role 1.  Again, 
call the players in role 1 men and the players in role 2 women.  First, note that in 
any matching equilibrium all men must be matched (since n1<n2, and otherwise an 
unmatched man and woman can improve their situation by matching) and all 
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matches must play a positive payoff equilibrium.   Second, suppose to the 
contrary of the proposition that there exists a matching equilibrium (call it ME1) 
where some woman, say W2, is unmatched while some other woman, say W4, is 
matched and that there exists another matching equilibrium (call it ME2) where 
W2 is matched and W4 is unmatched.  In order for ME1 to be a matching 
equilibrium it must be that the man W2 is matched with at ME2, say M1, strictly 
prefers (this preference will be strict since we have assumed no indifference) his 
ME1 spouse/Nash to playing the ME2 Nash with W2 (otherwise at ME1, W2 and 
M1 will prefer to link and play their ME2 Nash).  Similarly, in order for ME2 to 
be a matching equilibrium it must be that the woman M1 is matched with at ME1, 
say W5, strictly prefers her ME2 spouse/Nash to her ME1 spouse/Nash (otherwise 
at ME2, W5 and M1 will prefer to link and play their ME1 Nash).  In order for 
ME1 to be a matching equilibrium it must be that the man W5 is matched with at 
ME2 strictly prefers his ME1 spouse/Nash to his ME2 spouse/Nash.  If we keep 
repeating this process we will end up with all women who are matched at ME1 
must strictly prefer their ME2 spouse/Nash.  However this is not possible.  To see 
this recall that all men must be matched at every matching equilibrium.  Thus if 
there are n1 men then there must be n1 women who are matched at ME1 and who 
strictly prefer their ME2 spouse/Nash.  However, since W2 is unmatched at ME1 
but matched at ME2 and since we assumed no indifference, it must be that W2 
also strictly prefers her ME2 spouse/Nash, thus there are (n1+1) women who 
strictly prefer the ME2 equilibrium.  Since only n1 woman are matched at ME2 
this is not possible.  Thus it must be that the set of women who are unmatched is 
the same at both equilibria.  ◊ 
 
Proof of Theorem 2:  Let us first show that the set of matching equilibria is 
nonempty.  Order player roles so that ni ≥ nk , whenever i>k.    Let NE1 be the set 
of mixed strategy Nash equilibria that reach maximal payoff for the player role 1, 
subject to all other players getting at least 0.  Let NE2 be the subset of those that 
maximize player 2 types utilities, subject to being in NE1.  Inductively, let NEk 
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be the subset of those that maximize player role k’s utility, subject to being in 
NEk-1.    If NEn is empty, match all players to themselves.  Otherwise, select any 
matching f such that players in P1 are all matched and pick m such that all players 
play their role’s component from some mixed strategy profile in NEn (so that all 
players in the same role play the same mixed strategy). This forms a matching 
equilibrium.  
 
Next, let us argue that the set of equilibria is compact.  Given the finite set of 
possible matchings and the compact nature of the strategy spaces, we need only 
show that the set of strategy profiles that are part of an equilibrium for any given 
matching f is compact.  Let mr→m, where (mr,f) is a matching equilibrium for 
every r.  It is immediate that (a) is satisfied by m.  We need only verify that (b) is 
satisfied by m.  Suppose to the contrary that there exists p∈ P, and a profile of 
strategies m’p for the players in p such that uc(m’p)>Uc(m,f) for all c∈ p and such 
that m’p is a Nash equilibrium.  Then for large enough r, it follows that 
uc(m’p)>Uc(m
r,f) for all c∈ p, which is a contradiction.◊ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3:     Let us first show the ``if’’ part.   By (ii) mp is a Nash 
equilibrium for any matched group p under f and payoffs are nonnegative and so 
(a) of matching equilibrium is satisfied.  (b) is satisfied since by (iii) any deviating 
group p with deviating strategy m’p must have some player role i ≤ k for whom 
ui(f,m)≥vi(f,m)≥ui(m’p) (by the definition of PO(k) and since all players in roles 1 
to k are matched). 
    
Next, let us show the converse.  If not all players in roles 1 to k are matched, then 
there must be some complete group p of players who are not matched.  Consider 
any equilibrium m’p that gives positive payoffs to all players (and such a Nash 
equilibrium exists by the assumption of the theorem).  We then contradict (b) in 
the definition of matching equilibrium, as all players in p can strictly benefit by 
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forming a group playing m’p.  Thus, all players in P1 to Pk are matched and so (i) 
holds.  Next, note that (ii) follows directly from (a) in th definition of matching 
equilibrium.   Finally, let us show (iii).  Suppose to the contrary that  (v1(f,m), 
v2(f,m),…, vk(f,m))∉ PO(k).   Consider a group p consisting of a player from each 
player role 1 to k who is obtaining vi(f,m).  Since that  (v1(f,m), v2(f,m),…, 
vk(f,m))∉ PO(k), along with players in roles above k that were unmatched under f 
(if k<n).  It follows from the definition of PO(k) that there exists m’p∈NE that 
gives all players in p a positive payoff and makes all the players in the roles 1 to k 
in p strictly better off than under (f,m), and players in roles above k better off than 
being unmatched.   This contradicts (b), and so the supposition was incorrect, 
implying (iii). ◊ 
  
Proof of Theorem 4:  We prove the theorem by induction.  Recall that player 
roles are ordered so that ni ≥ nk  whenever i>k. 
 
First note that the set of possible histories is finite, and so strategies can be 
represented as a finite list of vectors, where each vector represents a mixed 
strategy to be played following a given history and thus belongs to a simplex.  
The set of repeated matching functions is finite.   
 
Theorem 2 established existence and compactness (and constant matching) for 
t=1. Supposing that the claim has been established for all t<T, we show that it is 
true for T.  Let us consider the case where there is some matching equilibrium for 
the one-period game that has players matched (so there is at least one Nash 
equilibrium that gives all players a nonnegative payoff), as the other case is 
obvious. 
 
We first show that GSRPE(T) is nonempty and has an element with a constant 
matching function.   Let f be a matching that has some equilibrium in GSRME(T-
1) for which the matching is constant and equal to f.  Let F(0)=f. H(1) is a finite 
set of possible histories that can occur in the first period.  Associate with each h in 
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H(1) the same continuation matching equilibrium in GSRME(T-1) that has the 
constant matching f.  This then defines (σ,F) except for σ(0).  Given that 
continuation payoffs are constant, pick any Nash equilibrium that gives all players 
nonnegative payoffs for σ(0).  Specifying this as σ(0) defines a (σ,F) in 
GSRPE(T), since (i) is satisfied by construction, and (ii) is satisfied since σ(0) is a 
Nash equilibrium that gives all players nonnegative payoffs and the continuation 
is independent of play in the first period.  Thus,  GSRPE(T) is nonempty and has 
at least one element with a constant matching function.  
 
Next, let us argue that GSRPE(T) is compact.  Let (σk,Fk) → (σ,F), where (σk,Fk) 
is in GSRPE(T) for each k.    By the compactness of GSRME(T-1), it follows that 
(i) is satisfied.  To see (ii), note that by the finiteness of the number of repeated 
matching functions, we can restrict attention to the case where Fk=F for each k. 
(ii) then follows, since any improving deviation from σ  would also be an 
improving deviation  from σk for large enough k.  
 
We now argue that GSRME(T) is nonempty and compact.   
 
We first argue that GSRME(T) is nonempty. Here we repeat the arguments of 
theorem 1, but using the elements in GSRPE(T) that have constant matchings and 
give all players nonnegative payoffs (and we know that this set is nonempty as 
argued above).  Order player roles so that ni ≥ nk , whenever i>k.    Let GSRPE1 
be the subset of elements of GSRPE(T) that have constant matchings and reach 
maximal payoff for player role 1, subject to all player roles getting at least 0.  Let 
GSRPE2 be the subset of those that maximize player 2 types utilities, subject to 
being in GSRPE1.  Inductively, let GSRPEk be the subset of those that maximize 
player role k’s utility, subject to being in NEk-1.    Pick an element (σ,F) of 
GSRPEn.  This satisfies both (a)  and (b) by construction.   
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Compactness of GSRME(T) now follows along similar lines as the proof of the 
corresponding claim in Theorem 1 (given the compactness of GSRPE(T)), as a 
violation of (a) or (b) at the limit of a sequence of equilibria would imply a 
violation far enough along the sequence. ◊ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  We use the definition of renegotiation-proof equilibrium 
(abbreviated RNE(t)) found in Benoit and Krishna (1993).  First, we show that 
matching every player and having every matched group play the same σ in 
RNE(1) must be a matching equilibrium of the 1 period game.  By definition of 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, σ must be a Nash equilibrium of the 1 period 
game and by assumption uj(σ)≥0 thus condition (a) of matching equilibrium is 
met.  Next consider condition (b) of matching equilibrium.  By definition of 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, players who are currently grouped together do 
not want to play a different Nash.  Since every group plays the same 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, it must be that every player in role i receives the 
same payoff thus there is no group of agents who want to rematch and play a 
different Nash, and so condition (b) must hold true.  Thus having every player 
matched and all groups play σ is a matching equilibrium of the 1 period game.   
 
Next, we show that having every player matched by some constant matching 
function F and having all groups play the same σ in RNE(t) (for any σ in RNE(t)) 
must be a group-stable repeated matching equilibrium of the t period game.  We 
do this by induction, presuming it to be true up through t-1.  Let us also presume 
that any (σ,F) in GSRME (t-1) such that some group is matched after all histories 
must have that group playing a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.11  We will show 
that the same things are true for t.  Let us first show that (σ,F) is in GSRPE(t).  By 
definition of renegotiation-proof equilibrium, all continuation payoffs of (σ,F) are 
in RNE(t-1).  So, by induction and the supposition that all continuation payoffs 
are nonnegative, all continuations of (σ,F) are in GSRME (t-1) for the (t-1) period 
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game.  Thus condition (i) is met.  Condition (ii) is met by the definition of 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium. Next, we show that (σ,F) is in GSRME(t).  By 
assumption uj(σ,F)≥0, and so condition (a) of group-stable repeated matching 
equilibrium is met.  Next we show that condition (b) is met.  Since every matched 
group plays the same σ, we know that every player in role i must have the same 
expected payoff (if one player i deviates, then all have incentive to deviate) and so 
we can just show that no group who is currently matched wants to change 
strategies as there will be no extra gain from a new group forming and changing 
strategies.  Given the induction step that any continuations of (σ,F) must have all 
constant groups playing a renegotiation-proof equilibrium, and that no other 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium can Pareto dominate the current renegotiation-
proof equilibrium (by the definition of renegotiation-proofness), it follows that  
(b) is satisfied.   Now suppose that (σ,F) is in GSRME (t) and that F is constant 
for some group and that group is not playing a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.   
By (ii) of GSRPE(t) it must be that this group is playing a subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium.  And by definition of renegotiation-proofness, it must then be that 
there exists a renegotiation-proof equilibrium which does better for all the 
individuals in this group than the subgame-perfect Nash that they are playing 
does.  However, the existence of such a renegotiation-proof equilibrium would 
violate (b) of the definition of GSRME. ◊ 
  
 
A strong group-stable repeated matching equilibrium of a t-period game, 
denoted SGSRME(t), is defined inductively as follows. 
 
Let SGSRME(1) be the matching equilibria of the 1 period game.  
 
Inductively, suppose that we have defined SGSRME through t-1.   
 
Let SGSRPE(t) be the set of (σ,F) in S(t) x MF(t) such that  
                                                                                                                                                              
11This does not imply the more general equivalence between GSRME and RNE, as there are other 
non-constant GSRME. 
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(i) (σ(h),F(h)) in SGSRME(t-1) for all h in H(1), and  
(ii) no player wants to deviate from σ(0) given the current matching F(0) 
and anticipating the continuation governed by (σ,F). 
 
Let SGSRME(t) be the set of  (σ,F) in SGSRPE(t) such that  
(a) there does not exist any p ∈ P, (σ’,F’) in SGSRPE(t), and c ∈ N with 
F(c,0)=p, F’(0,c)=c and Uc(σ’, F’)>Uc(σ,F), and  
(b) there does not exist any p ∈ P and (σ’,F’) in SGSRPE(t) such that  
Uc(σ’,F’)>Uc(σ,F) for all c in p. 
 
Notice that in the case of t=1, all repeated matching equilibrium definitions 
coincide with that of matching equilibrium.   
 
In the case where there is just one group and no issue of individual rationality, all 
definitions coincide with the definition of finite period renegotiation-proof 
equilibrium (e.g., Benoit and Krishna (1993)). 
 
 
Example 12: Nonexistence of Strong Group-Stable Repeated Matching 
Equilibrium 
 
There are two player roles and four players {1,2,3,4}.  Players 1 and 3 are in role 
1, players 2 and 4 are in role 2. 
 
Player role 1 is the row player and player role 2 is the column player.  Payoffs are 
as follows  
 
 left center right 
up 1, 4 -10, -10 7, -10 
middle -10, -10 4,1 -10, -10 
down -10, 7 -10, -10 5,5 
 
Here there are several matching equilibria in a one period game.  These are where 
all players are matched and each group plays either of the pure strategy equilibria: 
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up, left or middle center.   Note that any mixed strategy equilibrium gives a 
payoff of less than 1, and that down and right are weakly dominated strategies.   
 
The following is in SGSRPE(2):  in the first period:  
players 1,2 are matched and play down, right and get payoffs of (5,5).  
players 3,4 are matched and play up, left and get payoffs of (1,4). 
 
In the second period --   
If nobody from the first group deviated in the first period then 
players 1 and 4 are matched and play middle center and get payoffs of (4,1) 
players 3 and 2 are matched and play up left and get payoffs of (1,4) 
 
If someone from the first group deviated in the first period then  
players 1,4 are matched and play up left and get payoffs of (1,4) 
players 3,2 are matched and play middle center and get payoffs of (4,1) 
 
In terms of verifying that this is in SGSRPE(2) – it is clear that nobody will wish 
to  
deviate in the first period.  If one of players 1,2 deviates in the first period, they 
will all get a payoff of 1 in the second period, while if they do not deviate, they 
get a payoff of (4,4) in the second period.  So a deviating player will lose 3, but 
gain at most 2 in the first period.   
 
Now, we can see that SGSRME(2) is empty – since the fact that the players can 
get a payoff of (5,5)+(4,4)=(9,9); cannot be given to two groups at once.   
It is the second period regroupings that give players in roles 1 and 2 the incentives 
to play the prescribed strategies, and these regroupings are necessarily 
asymmetric.   
 
